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Abstract 
Historically, the process of nutrition transition begins with the shifts in demographic transition, 
moving away from high to low mortality, high to low fertility, high percentage of young population 
to high proportion of elderly population, high to low population growth rate; and short to long life 
expectancy at birth. The objective is to identify where Nepal is in demographic transition and 
whether demographic transition is considered as one of the proximate covariates of nutrition 
transition. Nepal’s position in the demographic transition has been identified by using Popkin’s 
framework which is scaled from Pattern I to Pattern V. The time series trends indicated that new 
patterns of demographic transition have been observed during 1995-2010, which is similar to the 
pattern IV of the nutrition transition as described by Popkin. Before 1970, the death rates were 
fluctuating around 30 to 50 deaths per thousand populations. The birth rate per thousand popula-
tions was more than 44, which was really high. Both fertility and mortality appear to start declin-
ing from 1970. During 1995-2010, birth rate declined from 38 to 24 per thousand populations. 
The time series trends indicated that new patterns of demographic transition have been observed 
during 1990-2010, which is similar to the transition between Pattern III and IV of the nutrition 
transition. Nepal is a country with faster declined in mortality followed by fertility decline, in-
creasing life expectancy above 60 years, decreasing age-structure of below 15 years of population, 
increasing trends of urban population and beginning of large scale international migration. It may 
be concluded from above evidences that Nepal is across the new pattern of transition after 1990s 
in the demographic transition including the increasing risk of chronic diseases of elderly people 
related to excess consumption of fat, sugar and process foods. 
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1. Introduction 
Demographic transition is a description of the observed long-term trends in fertility/mortality, age structure, and 
longevity and residency patterns [1]. In traditional societies both the fertility and mortality were high and in 
modern society both fertility and mortality are low. In between, there is a demographic transition. The theory of 
demographic transition classified various countries into three categories: the countries with high birth rates and 
high but declining death rates; declining birth rates and death rates, with death rates declining faster; and rapidly 
declining birth rates and death rates, with birth rates declining faster.  
A considerable amount of literature has been published on the demographic and nutrition transition in devel-
oping countries. These studies have indicated that demographic and nutrition transition is underway and rapid in 
such countries, with the simultaneous co-existence of undernutrition and obesity [2]. It is speculated that the 
process of demographic transition in Nepal began during the 1990s. However, patterns and trends of demo-
graphic transition in Nepal are continuously changing. In this circumstance, this study addressed the following 
research questions: Is Nepal a country in demographic transition? Where is it in each stage of the demographic 
transitions? What explanations are associated with these transitions? 
2. Objectives 
The main aim of the paper is to identify the demographic transition in Nepal over the past four decades. The 
specific objectives are as follow, to: 
1) identify the shifts and time-series trends of population dynamics to explain where Nepal was in the demo-
graphic transition. 
2) describe the patterns of these changes observed in population dynamics in Nepal. 
3) locate Nepal within the Popkin’s frame-work of the nutrition transition. 
3. Data and Methods 
This study adopts Popkin’s methodology for the identification of Nepal’s position in demographic transition [2]. 
There are ten proxy foci identified by Popkin to describe the nutrition transition, which are grouped into four 
categories—economic, demographic, dietary and epidemiological transitions for the purposes of this analysis. 
Demographic variables include four proxies: a) mortality/fertility; b) age-structure; c) life expectancy or longev-
ity; and d) residency patterns (Table 1). 
Although time series data generally exhibit random fluctuations, a time series may also show gradual shifts or 
movements to relatively higher or lower values over a longer period of time. If a time series plot exhibits this 
type of behaviour, we say that a trend pattern exists. A trend exists usually with the long-term dynamic vari-
ables/factors such as changing demographic characteristics - crude birth rates, crude death rates, age structure, 
life expectancy at birth and urban populations. 
The average annual percentage of change/growth of demographic proxy variables for the period of forty years 
starting from 1970 to 2010 have been computed using two methods. The first one is annual growth rate method 
hat that would take the country from first year’s level to the last. The formula for the average growth/change rate 
adopted for the computation is = {100*(<final value>/<initial value>)^(1/<number of years’ growth-1>)}-100 
[Or = {(1/time period-1) natural logarithm (ln) (<final value>/<initial value>)}*100]. 
The second one is ordinary least squares trend-line plotting method to predict the annual rate of growth for the 
exponential time line equation, which is minimizes the sum of squares of the difference between actual time se-
ries data and predicted time series data. Therefore, the estimated trend line is fitted best to capture the real trend 
of the past 40 years. 
The data types included in the CBS/N databases were: 
1) Population Censuses 
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Table 1. Data sources for demographic explanatory variables.                                                       
Proxy Parameters Explanatory variables Data Sources (1970-2010) 
Mortality & fertility 
• Crude Death Rate 
• Crude Birth Rate 
• Population Growth 
Census Surveys, Central Bureau of Statistics and the 
Ministry of Population, Nepal 
Age structure • Young and Working Age Population Ratio 
• Elderly and Working Age Population Ratio 
Annual Reports, Ministry of Population; and Statistical 
Reports, Central Bureau of Statistics, Nepal 
Life expectancy • Average life expectancy at birth Statistical Annual Reports, Central Bureau of Statistics 
Residency • % Population Rural & Urban Census Surveys, Central Bureau of Statistics 
 
2) Demographic Sample Surveys 
3) Vital Registration 
4) Population Registers 
5) Administrative Statistics/Official records 
According to broader framework of the nutrition transition, birth/death rates, age structure, life expectancy at 
birth, and residency patterns were considered as proxy foci to identify the position of demographic transition in 
Nepal. Age structure, prevalence of population ages 0 - 14; 15 - 64; and 65 and over, and young and old de-
pendency ratios were considered as additional demographic explanatory variables. Young dependency ratio is 
defined as the proportion of 0 - 15 years’ population divided by 15 - 64 years’ population. Elderly/old depend-
ency ratio is defined as the proportion of 65+ years’ population divided by 15 - 64 years’ population. Rural, ur-
ban, and total population were used as explanatory variables for residency patterns. 
The operational definition of the variables used by national statistical office and computation techniques are 
presented as follows. Population growth rate, the annual growth rate of population, was computed based on the 
natural logarithmic technique. The crude birth rate (CBR) is a measure of the rate of births among a population; 
it measures growth or decline of a population. Similarly, the crude death rate (CDR) is a measure of the rate of 
deaths among a population. The natural increase (NI) of population can be observed from the difference between 
CBR and CDR in the population of 1000 (or 100). Rates of CBR, CDR and NI was available from the census 
data of CBS/N. Proportion of population ages <15, 15 - 64, >64 (% of total) are the population between the ages 
of defined category ages less than 15, 15 to 64, more than 64 years as a percentage of the total population. This 
information was available from population databases of Ministry of Health and Population, and census databases 
of the Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Life expectancy at birth: the estimated number of years that a newborn could expect to live, if he or she were 
subject to the age-specific death rates of a given period. It measures how many years a new-born baby will be 
expected to live on average given current age-specific death rates. Life expectancy at birth is an indicator of 
longevity, mortality conditions and, by proxy, of health conditions. Age-specific death rates were required to 
compute the life expectancy at births that were available in the population databases of Ministry of Health and 
Population (MoHP), Nepal and census databases of CBS/N. Infant mortality rate; The number of infants, out of 
every 1000 babies born in a given year, who die before reaching age 1 [13]. Infants’ birth and death information 
was available from health databases of MoHP and census databases of CBS/N. 
However, the data gaps are also bridged up from the international databases including Population Reference 
Bureau (PRB) and United Nations Development Indicators to compare the countries of the south Asia. Initially, 
the data were collected in five years’ interval. Following this, the average annual rate of change for the past forty 
years starting from 1970 (or 1990) to 2010 was computed using natural logarithmic growth rate formula. 
4. Literature Review 
Demographic Transition 
Initially the concept of “Demographic Transition” was developed by the American demographer Warren 
Thompson, by observing the changes, or transitions, in birth and death rates in industrialized societies over the 
past two hundred years or so [1]. The demographic transition describes the change from pre-industrial high fer-
tility and mortality to post-industrial low fertility and mortality. Decline in mortality—especially infant and 
child mortality marks the beginning of almost all-demographic transition. The population growth is between the 
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fertility and mortality. The demographic transition must be accompanied by a cycle in population growth and in 
the age structure. Changes in the structure are especially intensified since infants and children enjoy most of the 
early declines in mortality [3]. Most countries have seen child and adult survival rates increase during the first 
stage of their demographic transition. This has usually been followed by a decline in fertility in the second stage 
and, thus, strongly decreasing young dependency ratios [4]. 
Demographic transition also called demographic evolution, each hypothesis established by many demogra-
phers such as Thompson, Notestein, Blacker, Davis and so on, many widely supported. They wanted to explain 
population change in association with the modernization processes, which started in the later part of the 19th 
century. However, it should be noted that this hypothesis is exclusively based on the historical experience of 
Western countries [5]. 
Embedded in the classical demographic transition theory is the concept of modernization and development, 
which brings about changes in mortality and fertility. Initially decline in mortality takes place and fertility de-
cline is the response to this decline in mortality. Timing of fertility response depends on the level of develop-
ment and modernization in the countries concern [6]. 
However the European fertility project which found no evidences of association between socioeconomic de-
velopment and demographic change [5]. Caldwell provided further critique to demographic transition theory by 
stressing the importance of western values regarding nuclear families. In another words western values were 
more important than the level of development [6]. Caldwell’s argument has also been challenged by the different 
studies, which have cited the presence of nuclear families before the demographic transition [7]. Finally, it 
should be noted that demographic transition should include not only vital events, but also mobility transitions, 
which has not been dealt explicitly by classical traditional demographic transition theory. The reason is that mi-
gration and distribution of population is not only concomitant with fertility and mortality, but also closely re-
lated with modernization [5]. 
Although there is still some controversy over the demographic transition theory, it is still an important theory 
commonly discussed to explain the demographic changes, which are taking place around the world. The first 
stage of demographic change is the time when the both the fertility and mortality fluctuate and are quite high. 
This is the period when the natural growth rate of the population is quite low [8] [9]. The second stage of transi-
tion is when the mortality starts to decline while fertility remains more or less constant this is the period when 
the growth rate starts to take place [10]. 
At the third stage, fertility also starts to decline as a response to declining mortality. Finally the fourth stage is 
when fertility and mortality are quite close and fertility is close to response replacement and fluctuates according 
to different environmental conditions [11]. 
The outcome of demographic transition has been already capitalised by the western and Southeast Asian 
countries through demographic “dividend”. The demographic dividend is delivered through a number of me-
chanisms. The most important are labour supply, gross domestic savings, and human capital formation [3]. 
The demographic transition affects labour supply in two ways. First, there is an essentially mechanical effect, 
based on the regular and inevitable aging of the baby boom generation. When this generation is between 15 and 
64, it is more likely to be working, thus lowering the ratio of dependents to non-dependants [10]. During the 
peak working years of 25 to 59, this effect is especially strong. The number of people who would like to work 
(labour supply) therefore gets bigger, and provided the labour market can absorb the larger numbers of workers, 
per capita production increases [12].  
Second, women are more likely to enter the workforce, as family size declines. This effect is magnified by the 
fact that, with adult women themselves more likely to have been brought up in small families, they are more 
likely to be educated [13]. This increases their productivity in the labour market, underlining progress towards a 
stronger workforce and smaller families [3]. 
The demographic transition also encourages the growth of savings, thus improving a country’s prospects for 
investment and growth [9]. Again, there is an accounting and a behavioural effect at work [3]. The young and 
the old consume more than they generate, unlike working-age people, who tend to have a higher level of eco-
nomic outputs, and also a higher level of savings [14]. Further, people tend to save more between the ages of 40 
and 65, when they are less likely to be investing in their children and the need to prepare for their retirement is 
becoming more stable [15]. So when large numbers of baby boomers start hitting their forties, national savings 
will tend to rise [16].  
Incentives to make certain choices can reinforce this tendency to save among the new young baby boomers 
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Improved health, and longevity, make saving easier and more attractive [9]. A healthy population must plan far 
in advance if it is to maintain its standard of living through decades of retirement [3]. A nuclear family, with 
both parents working, is likely to save more for the maintenance of future retirements [17]. Additionally, private 
household savings can provide the capital accumulation needed to finance growth, as seen in East Asia. 
Finally, the demographic transition has significant effects on investments in human capital; effects that are the 
least tangible, but may be the most significant and far-reaching [13]. The demographic transition begins with 
changes in mortality that results in a population that lives longer and stays healthier. A longer life expectancy 
causes fundamental changes in the way that people live [3]. Attitudes to education, family, retirement, the role 
of women and work all tend to shift. A society, especially if it is taking full advantage of the demographic divi-
dend, is certain to experience deep-rooted changes in its culture, as its people become more valuable assets [6]. 
As life expectancy increases, parents are likely to choose to educate their children to more advanced levels. 
Healthier children, in turn, tend to experience greater cognitive development per year of schooling than their less 
healthy counterparts [3]. The result of this educational investment is that the labour force as a whole becomes 
more productive, promoting higher wages and a better standard of living [6]. Women and men therefore tend to 
enter the workforce later, partly because they are being educated for longer, but they are likely to be more pro-
ductive once they start working [3]. 
All these mechanisms are heavily dependent on the policy environment. A growing number of adults will 
only be productive if there is sufficient flexibility in the labour market to allow its expansion, and macroeco-
nomic policies that permit and encourage investment [6]. Similarly, people will only save if they have access to 
adequate saving mechanisms and have confidence in domestic financial markets [3]. 
Finally, the demographic transition creates conditions where people will tend to invest in their health and 
education, offering great economic benefits, especially in the modern worlds increasingly sophisticated econo-
mies [3]. But governments invariably play a vital role in creating an environment where high quality health and 
education provision is possible-necessary steps to make the most of their country’s demographic opportunities 
[11]. 
5. Results 
5.1. Size of Population 
Nepal’s population of 28.8 million seems very small compared to its giant neighbours, India and China. Its high 
rate of population growth has been a matter of great concern for the country. The inter census annual population 
growth rate of Nepal was 2.05% in 1970s, but it was 1.3%, still high, in 2011. The increase in population in inter 
census period during 1970s was 22.7 percent in 1070, but it was 14.4 percentage in 2011. International migra-
tion has also begun in Nepal from 1991 and net out migration reached to 1,690,938 in 2010 (Table 2). 
The increasing number of net out migration is an unclear matter in Nepal because there may be confounding 
effects of internal as well as international migration from the open boarder. There may be internal migration 
from the Mountain and Hill regions to the Terai, but the evidence of these figures migration are not clear. On the 
other hand, there is also a free flow of migrants across the open boarder between India and Nepal, which may be 
a very imprecise issue to infer.  
5.2. Birth and Death Rates 
The major two primary demographic processes that determine the structure, distribution and growth of any 
population are birth and death rates. The death rates in Nepal declined remarkably for the first time during 
1970-1990 followed by the decline in birth rates during 1990-2010. Death rates are approaching the lower level, 
but birth rates are falling down but they are still relatively higher. 
Crude death rates have decreased over the past four decades; but the population is still growing. The CDR per 
1000 population has decreased from 22.2 in 1970 to 6.2 in 2010. Similarly, Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) per 
1000 population has decreased from 167.3 in 1970 to 47.1 in 2010. The CBR per 1000 population decreased 
from 43.9 in 1970 to 25.6 in 2010. The TFR per woman has also decreased from 6.4 to 3.0 from 1970 to 2010. 
The overall population is still growing by 2.3% per annum. 
Mortality in Nepal started to decline before the 1970s and the pace of mortality decline has become faster 
since the 1990s. CDR was a little over 35 in 1950s, which decreased to less than 20 in 1970s and further to 6.2  
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Table 2. Size of population in Nepal.                                                                         
Census year Total Population Inter-census population Change Inter-census Natural Increase 
Inter-census net migration 
(estimate) 
1971 11,555,983 2,142,987 2,542,316 −399,329 
1981 15,022,839 3,466,856 3,154,796 312,060 
1991 18,491,097 3,468,258 4,622,774 −1,154,516 
2001 23,151,423 4,660,326 5,556,342 −896,016 
2011 26,494,504 3,343,018 5,033,956 −1,690,938 
 
in 2010. IMR of around 250 per thousand live births prevailed in the country during the fifties [13]. In the sev-
enties, it was decreased to around 170 per thousand live births. It has reached to 47 per 1000 live births in 2011.  
Fertility in Nepal was declining slowly till nineties, and thereafter, it started to decline in the greater pace. The 
CBR is around 25 per thousand in Nepal in 2010. The level of TFR till mid-nineties was around 5. A substantial 
reduction in fertility can be seen during the period 2000 to 2010 when a decline of more than one child per 
women was observed. 
The time series trend line of birth rates, crude (per 1000 people) computed from least squares trend line plot-
ting method shows that the trend line explains approximately 96.0% of reality (R2 = 0.8592). The real annual 
rate of decline of birth rates, crude (per 1000 people) is 1.3% (Figure 1). The trend line equation in the graph 
indicates that the real decline in births was approximately 2.0% per year, but there are two distinct patterns in 
the periods before and after 1990. The declining rate of births before 1990 was slower than after 1990. 
The time series trend line of death rates, crude (per 1000 people) computed from least squares trend line plot-
ting method shows that the trend line explains approximately 99.3% of reality (R2 = 0.9929). The real annual 
rate of decline of birth rates, crude (per 1000 people) is 3.1% (Figure 1). The trend line equation in the graph 
indicates that the real decline in births was approximately three% per year, but there are two distinct patterns in 
the periods before and after 1990. The declining rate of death before 1990 was faster than after 1990, which is 
quite opposite to the birth rates. 
Above statistics indicate that Nepal and Pakistan are, little bit behind in demographic transition whereas the 
demographic transition in other South Asian countries is faster than Nepalese transition, because the CBR, TFR 
and population growth rates are still high in Nepal compared to the other South Asian Countries (Table 3). 
5.3. Age Structure of Population 
The population of Nepal is comprised primarily a below 15-year population, and since the 1970s, it has always 
remained young. More than 36 percent of present population is under 15 years of age. More than half of the 
population is in the age group 15 - 64. This age structure indicates approximately one person is in the working 
ages (15 - 64 years) has to take care of more than one infant/young and old populations. This age structure with 
high dependency on working age population is mainly due to high fertility and declining mortality in all ages, 
particularly in below 15 ages. 
The young population is relatively decreasing in Nepal, but the working age populations have been gradually 
increasing over the past four decades. From 1990 to 2010, the prevalence of young people (0 - 14 years) has 
been decreasing annually by 0.3%. An increase of 0.2% is found for the group aged 15-64 years. The important 
point here is that a large cohort population is entering into the working age group in coming 10 to 15 years, 
which is going to create large dividend to the economy if the country can invest for human capital formation. 
There has been an annual decrease in the young dependency ratio of 0.5%. On the other hand, the elderly popu-
lation aged 65 and over, has also increased by an annual rate of 0.9%. In 1970 a large prevalence of the popula-
tion (41.5%) was under 15 years of age, which decreased to 36.2% in 2010. 
The time series trend line of population ages 0 - 14 (% of total) computed from least squares trend line plot-
ting method shows that the trend line explains approximately 44.0% of reality (R2 = 0.4417). The real annual 
rate of decline of population ages 0 - 14 (% of total) is 0.20 % (Figure 2). There are two distinct patterns in the 
periods before and after 1990. The proportion of population ages 0 - 14 (% of total) population ages 0 - 14 (% of 
total)was stagnant before 1990, but started declining slowly after 1990; the overall annual average rate of de-
cline for the whole period is very weak. 
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Figure 1. Birth and death trends in Nepal.                                         
 
 
Figure 2. Age structure of population in Nepal.                                         
 
Table 3. Comparison of south Asian countries.                                          
 BR (1000) DR (1000) NI (1000) IMR (1000) 
Bangladesh 23 6 17 43 
Bhutan 20 7 13 47 
India 22 7 15 47 
Nepal 24 6 18 46 
Pakistan 28 8 20 68 
Sri Lanka 18 6 22 12 
 
The time series trend line of population ages 15 - 64 (% of total) computed from least squares trend line plot-
ting method shows that the trend line explains approximately 18.4% of reality (R2 = 0.1842). The real annual 
rate of increase of population ages 15 - 64 (% of total), is 0.1% (Figure 2). The trend line equation in the graph 
indicates that the real increase in the proportion of population ages 15 - 64 (% of total) is negligible, but there 
are two distinct patterns in the periods before and after 1990. The growth proportion of population ages 15 - 64 (% 
of total) was stagnant before 1990, but started increasing slowly after 1990, the resultant annual average rate of 
increase for the whole period is very weak. 
The time series trend line of ratio of dependents to working age population computed from least squares trend 
line plotting method shows that the trend line explains approximately 19.0% of reality (R2 = 0.1878). The real 
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annual rate of decline of dependents to working age population is 0.1% (Figure 2). There are two distinct pat-
terns in the periods before and after 1990. The proportion of dependents to working age population was increas-
ing before 1990, but started declining after 1990; the resultant annual average rate of change for the whole pe-
riod is very weak. 
5.4. Life Expectancy (Longevity) 
The expectation of life at birth for males was 27.1 in 1955 [19]. These figures increased to 57 in 1995. Such a 
significant change in life expectancy may be due to the improvement of health facilities that has reduced death 
rates, especially between infant and children during the last decade [13]. Life expectancy has increased by 1.2% 
every year. In 1970 the average life expectancy of Nepalese people was 42.81 years, which had increased to 
67.6 years in 2010. 
The time series trend line of life expectancy at birth computed from least squares trend line plotting method 
shows that the trend line explains approximately 99.2% of reality (R2 = 0.9919). The real annual rate of growth 
of life expectancy at birth is 1.2% (Figure 3). There is a solid pattern of growth of longevity throughout the pe-
riod of past 40 years. The resultant annual average rate of growth of life expectancy at birth for the whole period 
is consistent. 
5.5. Residency Patterns of Population 
The residency pattern in Nepal has greatly changed. The proportion of urban population, considered as a proxy 
of urbanisation in Nepal, increased from 4.0% in 1970 to 21.0% in 2010. This includes natural increase and mi-
gration to the cities. 
The time series trend line of total population (R2 = 0.9995), rural population (R2 = 0.9972) and urban popula-
tion (R2 = 0.9988) computed from least squares trend line plotting method show that these trend lines explains 
approximately 99.9% of reality. The real annual rate of growth of urban population is 6.3%. The trend line equa-
tion in the graph indicates that the residency pattern in terms of urban population was increased by more than six 
per cent per year (Figure 4). The trend lines clearly indicate that the period before and after 1990 has distinctly 
two different patterns. The increase in urban population was slower before 1990 and became faster after 1990, 
but the growth of total population (2.36%) and rural population (1.96%) are uniform throughout the 40 years pe-
riod. 
Altogether Hill and Mountain regions comprise 77% of the total land area and have about 49.7% of the total 
population in 2011. Terai region comprises 23% of the total land area and contains 50.3% of the population 
(Table 4). 
The proportion of Mountain and Hill regions population to total population was 62.4% in 1971, but it reached 
to 50.27% in 2011. The proportion of Terai region population to total population was 37.6 percent in 1971, but it 
reached to 50.3 percent in 2011 (Table 4). The proportion of Mountain and Hill region populations are gradu-
ally decreasing in each census period, but the Terai region’s proportion is increasing. The increasing number of  
 
 
Figure 3. Life expectancy at birth in Nepal.                                         
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Figure 4. Urban and rural populations in Nepal.                                         
 
Table 4. Geographic distribution of population in Nepal.                                              
Census yrs. Mountains Hill Mountain and Hill Terai Total 
1971 1,138,610 (9.9) 6,071,407 (52.5) 7,210,017 (62.4) 4,345,966 (37.6) 11,555,983 
1981 1,302,896 (8.7) 7,163,115 (45.5) 8,466,011 (56.4) 6,556,828 (43.6) 15,022,839 
1991 1,443,130 (7.8) 8,419,889 (45.5) 9,863,019 (53.3) 8,628,078 (46.7) 18,491,097 
2001 1,687,859 (7.3) 10,251,111 (44.3) 11,938,970 (51.6) 11,212,453 (48.4) 23,151,423 
2011 1,781,792 11,394,007 13,175,799 13,318,705 26,494,504 
 (6.7) (43.0) (49.7) (50.3)  
 
emigration in the Terai is not clear because there may be due to internal and/or international migration from the 
open boarder. 
6. Discussion 
Since 1950, Asia has witnessed a dramatic demographic transition, affecting the population growth rate, deaths, 
and births. It has implications for the environment, schooling, the position of women and social security [13]. 
The salient changes involved in this transition include reduction in the infant mortality rate by over two-thirds, 
from 184 infant deaths to 51 per 1000 live births and an increase in life expectancy at birth by 25 years; decline 
in the TFR by more than half, from around six children per woman to 2.6; and decrease of 0.6 percentage points 
in the population growth rate [11]. Although the transition has been under way across the length and breadth of 
Asia, its onset, speed, and present status vary greatly between and also within countries [16]. The national de-
mographic profiles, which were generally similar in the 1950s, now differ widely and divide into three distinct 
regional clusters—South Asia with high population growth rate and high fertility; South-east Asia moderate with 
population growth rate and moderate fertility; and East Asia with low population growth rate low fertility [6]. 
The population growth rates across Asia’s three regions differ greatly, ranging from 0.6% in East Asia, 1.3% 
in South-east Asia to 1.7% in South Asia (Mari-Bhat, 2002). Projected over the next 20 years, 65% of the in-
crease in population (492 out of 757 million) will be in South Asia, which by 2025 would account for close to 
half of the population of Asia (46.2%) [11]. 
Like industrial revolutions, the demographic transition takes many decades in 19th century Europe, but it has 
been much faster in post war Asia. The practices, investments, and technologies that had been development and 
put into practice in Europe did not exist in Asia [6]. There was a big gap between best health practice prevailing 
in industrialized Europe and local health practice prevailing in Asia. The process was speeded up even further 
by investment in health-improving social overhead, which was heavily financed by world funding agencies. The 
possibilities for an Asian catch up with the west in terms of health and demography where enormous in the late 
1940s, may be driven by external factors [3]. In the half century since then, Asia has exploited the catch-up 
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potential with such enthusiasm that it has produced one of the fastest and most dramatic transitions ever seen [18]. 
Asia’s demographic transition followed the stylized model by starting with a decline in mortality rates. By the 
late 1940s, the crude death rate began declining very rapidly everywhere in Asia. The decline proceeded most 
rapidly in east Asia and it was accompanied by an increase in life expectancy from 61.2 to 74.6 years from 1960 
to 1992 [6]. Similar declines occurred in southeast and south Asia where life expectancy improved from 51.6 to 
67.2 and from 46.9 to 60.6, respectively [13]. In the 1950s and 1960s, most of the aggregate mortality decline 
was being driven by mortality decline in the youngest cohorts [3]. 
There are a number of possible explanations for the rapid decline in Asian child mortality in the middle of the 
century, which, after all, was the real force driving the age distribution over the first two phases of the demo-
graphic transition. One possibility has already been suggested: in the 1940s, Asia escaped from four or five 
decades of relative isolation, ushering in an era of health technology transfer and diffusion of new public health 
programs and techniques [6]. Another possibility is that increased agriculture productivity and trade in food both 
raised nutrition sufficiently to lower infant mortality dramatically over less than a decade, and did so everywhere 
in Asia [18]. Perhaps, but it seem unlikely given that magnitude and timing of that mortality decline was so 
similar everywhere in Asia, regardless of level of development and productivity performance in agriculture [13]. 
The demographic transition in East Asia was mostly exogenous. Like the stylized version, the infant mortality 
decline in the Asian demographic transition was followed, with a lag, by decline in fertility [11]. While the tim-
ing of the mortality decline was remarkably similar across rich and poor Asia, the lag between the drop in mor-
tality and fertility, as well as the size of the ensuring fertility fall, varied [3]. The crude birth rate in East Asia 
does fall much more rapidly than it does in Southeast or South Asia, but the timing is not so different. In the 
most countries, like Singapore, Korea, and Malaysia, fertility began to decline about fifteen years after the child 
mortality drop [6]. In countries, like Thailand, the delay was longer, closer to 25 years [18]. What is remarkable 
about the onset of the Asian fertility decline is the very short period over which it occurred and that it was so 
dramatic everywhere, even where the pace of economic development was slow [6]. 
There are, of course, a number of possible explanations for the decline in fertility. Two well-known demog-
raphers argue that government intervention mattered a great deal and that the intervention was distinctly Asian 
[3]. The general view seems to be that family planning programs have been central to the decline in Asian fertil-
ity, beginning with India in 1951 [11]. 
The pace and timing of the demographic transition has led to enormously divergent trends in population 
growth and population age structure across Asia [6]. The ratio of the working-age population to the non-working 
age population for the three sub regions in Asia with only two precocious exception, Japan and Sri Lanka, 
Asia’s surge to peak youth dependency rates occurred in the 1960s and 1970s; reflected the low ratio of the 
working-age population to the non-working-age population [3]. With the exception of Japan, the elderly de-
pendency rate has been mostly irrelevant to Asia in this century, even to the more economically mature East 
Asia [6]. 
The ratio of working-age population to non-working—age population is rising in Asia seen 1975, but this in-
crease has been especially dramatic in East Asia [13]. According to the UN projections, the ratio of working-age 
population to non-working-age population will peak East Asia in 2010 (ending the second phase of demographic 
transition), followed by decline (the third phase of demographic transition) [3]. This reflects the increase in the 
elderly dependency rate in East Asia as the knot in the age distribution works to change the direction of popula-
tion dynamics. 
During the period 1950-2004, mortality decline sharply in most countries of Asia and preceded the fertility 
decline, by several decades in many cases. The CDR dropped by two-thirds from around 24 per 1000 during the 
early 1959s to eight per 1000 in 2004 [13]. Life expectancy at birth in the region, which in the 1950s averaged a 
mere 41 years, had by 2004 risen by 25 years, with a regional breakdown of 28 years in East Asia, 24 in the 
South-east and 23 years in the South Asia. in 1950, no country in Asia had a life expectancy of more than 75 
years and only few became equal or exceeded 60 years [11]. Now only Afghanistan, Cambodia and East Timor 
have a life expectancy of less than 60 at birth [13].  
Notwithstanding these dramatic improvements, the gap between high and low mortality countries continues to 
be wide, and wider still in under-five mortality. The under-five morality rate per 1000 live births ranges from 89 
in South Asia, 53 in South-east Asia to 39 in East Asia, and 10 per 1000 (or less) in Hong Kong, Japan and Sin-
gapore [6]. The mortality pattern for South Asia is distinctive with very high death rates among children (up to 
age 15) and the elderly, indicating high incidences of infectious and parasitic diseases, which can be easily 
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avoided by means of basic medical care [3].  
The gender differences in mortality and life expectancy in the South Asia region stand out as being contrary 
to the usual pattern. The mortality rate for girls (aged 0 - 5) is higher than the corresponding rates for boys, 
which reflects the widespread preferential treatment of boys [18]. Life expectancy for females is not higher than 
that for males, as it normally is, but either the same, as in Bangladesh, or shorter, as in India [11]. However, Sri 
Lanka and Iran, also in South Asia, conform to the usual norm of longer life expectancy of females than of 
males, as do South- east and East Asia [13]. 
With a delay following the downward trend in mortality, the total fertility rate in Asia has dropped sharply 
from six children in the 1950s to 2.4 births per woman in 2000 [6]. Almost all countries have experienced a de-
cline, but the extent of the decline, its time pattern, and the current rates vary greatly across countries and in-
ter-regional differences within some countries. 
In terms of the TFRs, South-east Asia is the most heterogeneous region with member countries in all three 
columns. In contrast, East Asia is the most homogeneous; bar Mongolia, every country in the region has a be-
low-replacement TFR and the region as whole is in the final stage of transition. Similarly, apart from Sri Lanka, 
every country in South Asia has a higher than replacement level TFR [13]. This contrast ties in with the popula-
tion growth rate in South Asia being almost three times that in East Asia, 1.7% compared with 0.6% [18]. 
The demographic transition that Asian countries would face in the near future will vary with the stages of the 
transition. In the countries in the initial phase of the transition with a high TFR and population growth rate, such 
as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal and Pakistan, the challenge would be to educate the swelling numbers 
of children in the age group 6 - 14, and to provide employment to the entrants to the labour force [13]. The cur-
rent and past TFRs have a far-reaching impact on the age structure of the population, usually summarised by the 
percentage of children (under age 15) and of the elderly (aged 65 or above) in the population [6]. 
Population migration, mostly rural-to-urban and associated urbanisation, which does both widen economic 
opportunities open to the labour force; and create problems such as the increased pressure on the exploitation of 
natural resources [6]. In Asia, as elsewhere, urbanisation has taken two forms: first, the expansion of existing 
urban settlements combined with rural-to-urban migration and, second, and the urbanisation of rural localities 
without migration [3]. 
7. Where Is Nepal in the Demographic Transition? 
Before 1970, the death rates in Nepal were fluctuating around 30 to 50 deaths per thousand populations. The 
birth rate per thousand populations was more than 44, which was really high. Both fertility and mortality appear 
to start declining from 1970. During 1995-2010, birth rates declined from 38 to 24 per thousand populations. 
The population of Nepal is still growing faster. In terms of demographic transition, it is still relatively young 
because approximately 60% of population is of below 15 years, while the national average life expectancy at 
birth is approximately 68 years, and elderly dependency ratio is very low [19]. It may be concluded from above 
evidences that Nepal is across the new pattern of transition after 1990 in the demographic transition described by 
Popkin (Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Patterns of demographic transition Nepal (highlighted block in the Popkin’s Framework).                          
Patterns/ Variables Pattern I: Collecting food 
Pattern II: 
Famine 
Pattern III: 
Receding Famine 
Pattern IV: 
Degenerative diseases 
Pattern V: 
Behavioural Change 
Mortality /fertility High mortality and low fertility 
High fertility and 
high infant and  
maternal mortality 
Mortality declines faster, 
fertility declines slowly 
and population rises 
Low mortality and  
fertility; and fertility 
below replacement 
Low mortality and  
fertility-replacement 
level 
Age structure Natural balance High infant  dependency ratio 
High young people  
dependency ratio 
Elderly dependency  
ratio rises 
High elderly population 
dependency ratio 
Life expectancy Low 
Short life and life 
expectancy less  
than 55 years 
Medium range of  
life-life expectancy  
under 60 years 
Life expectancy 60 plus 
years; decreases under  
15 population 
Life-expectancy more 
than 70 years; long life 
Residency Low density of population 
Dominance of  
rural settlements 
Rural urban migration 
begins 
Urban population  
disperses and  
emigration begins 
Expansion of small  
low dense cities 
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Nepal’s position in the demographic transition has been identified by using Popkin’s framework which is 
scaled from Pattern I to Pattern V (Table 5). The time series trends indicated that new patterns of demographic 
transition have been observed during 1990-2010, which is similar to the transition between Pattern III and IV of 
the nutrition transition as described by Popkin [2]. Popkin suggests a country with faster declining mortality, 
slow fertility declining in rural areas, increasing population, increasing life expectancy above 60 years, decreas-
ing age-structure of below 15 years of population but still dependency ratio, increasing trends of urban popula-
tion and beginning of international migration, is considered as the country in transition from Pattern III to IV in 
the demographic transition. It may be concluded from above evidence that Nepal is across the new pattern of 
transition after 1990s in the demographic transition including the increasing risk of chronic diseases of elderly 
people possibly related to increasing life expectancy and excess consumption of fat, sugar and process foods. 
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